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REVIEW ESSAY
CHINA’S NEW “IMPERIAL” NAVY
Bruce Elleman
Cole, Bernard D. The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters
the Twenty-first Century. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2001. 320pp. $34.95
Kondapalli, Srikanth. China’s Naval Power. New Delhi:
Knowledge World, 2001. 252pp. (no price given)
Wright, Richard N. J. The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862–1945.
London: Chatham, 2000. 208pp. $48.95
At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet navy was eliminated almost overnight as
the world’s second most powerful naval force. Russia’s Pacific fleet is now so
poorly supplied and equipped that it rarely leaves port. This unprecedented re-
versal of fortune has created a maritime vacuum
throughout East Asia, leaving a wide range of regional
powers, including the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and Japan,
hoping to fill that vacuum.
Despite the current terror war, China still looms on
the horizon as potentially the most important and
dangerous rising power of the dawning Pacific cen-
tury. The Chinese are intent upon using the fruits of
their continuing economic growth to restore their his-
torical position of regional dominance in Asia. The
failure to integrate Japan (the rising power of the last
century) peacefully into the international order cost
the United States a world war in Asia. A similar failure
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with a nuclear-armed China could have catastrophic consequences. For the last
two decades China has focused its development efforts on its economy, but re-
cently its attention has turned toward the military, especially the navy, with the
acquisition of capital ships from Russia. China is currently building a navy capa-
ble of projecting its power beyond its littorals. How it will choose to use its in-
creasingly capable military has global implications.
Bruce Swanson’s Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for
Seapower (Naval Institute Press, 1982) and David Muller’s China as a Maritime
Power (Westview Press, 1983) were useful for their time, but the extraordinarily
rapid global and Far Eastern maritime developments during the final years of
the last century require an in-depth study and reevaluation of China’s naval am-
bitions for the twenty-first century. Therefore, the publication of the three
books reviewed here is particularly timely.
Richard Wright’s The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862–1945, provides a wealth of
data concerning the early history of China’s modern navy. Although the bulk of
this work is concerned with tracing (often in mind-numbing detail) the history
and specifications of individual Chinese steamships, arsenals, and armaments,
Wright emphasizes three important facets of China’s early naval development:
China used the navy not only to promote coastal defense but to quell domestic
unrest; its fear of putting too much power into a single naval organization com-
pelled it to divide its navy into several competing fleets; and it tended to pur-
chase, rather than build itself, top-of-the-line ships and armaments. Each facet
exhibits strong parallels with contemporary naval developments in China.
According to Wright, the initial impetus for a Chinese steam navy was not to
promote China’s foreign policy abroad but to quell internal unrest, the Taiping
Rebellion of 1852–63. The so-called Lay-Osborn Flotilla, composed of seven
British-built ships, was China’s first serious effort to employ a modern fleet.
Faced with an internal rebellion that threatened to overthrow the government,
“it seemed logical to some of the authorities to try to acquire some proper war-
ships to help in suppressing the revolt.”
Although the flotilla never played an important role in the suppression of the
Taipings and was broken up in 1863 and sold, this event emphasizes the impor-
tance of domestic factors in the construction of the Chinese navy. During the
mid-twentieth century, the Nationalists tried and failed to use their navy to defeat
the Communists. It can be argued that today’s Chinese navy remains focused not
on a foreign opponent but on a domestic one, since its most important function is
to oppose what Beijing portrays as the illegal separatist government on Taiwan.
Thus a constant objective of the Chinese navy during the past century and a half
would appear to be the suppression of domestic rebellion.
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Related to quelling domestic opposition has been China’s goal to promote
coastal defense. Since China is a land empire, a primary foreign policy objective
throughout much of its history has been to keep other powers away from its bor-
ders—its navy has focused on a defensive role. In this regard, Japan has been one
of China’s traditional enemies since the sixteenth century, when Japanese “pi-
rates” regularly raided the Chinese coast. During the Sino-Japanese War of
1894–95, the Japanese navy achieved a resounding victory against China, result-
ing in the integration of Taiwan into the Japanese empire. Finally, during the
1937–45 conflict, the Nationalists fought in vain to keep Japan out of Manchuria
and central China, but the Japanese annihilated the Nationalist navy.
As China has grown in power, so has its military mission. In the last decade
coastal defense has expanded to include increasingly vocal sovereignty claims
over far-flung island chains. Given China’s historical experience with Japan, and
given its broadening regional ambitions, developing the ability to counter Japan
remains a central concern of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). As re-
cently as December 2001, Japanese coast guard ships sank a suspected North Ko-
rean spy ship in China’s exclusive economic zone. Beijing protested and has
sought to impede Japan’s recovery of the wreckage. Immediately afterward, in
January 2002, the People’s Republic announced plans to purchase two addi-
tional Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers. These ships will add to
China’s growing capability to threaten Taiwan, on the one hand, and to reduce
Japanese East Asian naval supremacy, on the other.
The historical focus of the Chinese navy on the suppression of domestic re-
bellion and defense against foreign invasion helps explain the PLAN’s current
organization and fleet structure. During the nineteenth century, the Chinese
navy was divided into four fleets: one based in Canton (modern-day
Guangzhou); another in Fuzhou, Fujian, the province that included Taiwan; the
Nanyang, or “southern fleet,” based near Shanghai; and the Beiyang, or “north-
ern fleet,” based in Port Arthur, Manchuria. Each fleet was responsible for de-
fending a specific geographic area against attack. According to Wright the
“southernmost provinces were invariably treated as entities completely separate
from the central and northern sections of the country.” In addition to emphasiz-
ing domestic and coastal security, this naval organization offered another ad-
vantage: subdividing the navy into regional fleets helped to ensure that these
forces could not combine to challenge the central government. For China’s auto-
cratic rulers, the adage “divide and rule” was always a guiding principle.
Although dividing China’s naval power may have helped its imperial rulers to
insure against rebellion and dynastic overthrow, this policy proved disastrous in
war. For example, during the 1880s China’s northern fleet refused to help the
southern fleet fight France, resulting in the loss of China’s hold over its tributary
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Annam (Vietnam). Ten years later, the southern fleet responded in kind, refus-
ing to help the northern fleet during the Sino-Japanese War, and China lost con-
trol over Korea and Taiwan. As Wright observes, even a relatively simple
redistribution of weapons from south to north during this war might have made
“a significant improvement to the fleet’s gunnery performance.”
After World War II, the Nationalists centralized their navy only to learn the
hard way of the dangers inherent in a unified Chinese navy. The flagship
Chongqing mutinied and defected to the Communists in 1949, which spurred
most of the Nationalist navy to defect during the following months. Concern
over a similar embarrassment clearly motivated the Communists to divide the
PLAN into northern, central, and southern fleets; should the PRC ever reunify
with Taiwan, its navy presumably would become the fourth fleet, filling the for-
mer role of the Fuzhou fleet.
The PRC’s decision to reintroduce the traditional fleet organization suggests
that precluding domestic rebellion is still its main concern. However, Beijing
faces a tradeoff. Just as a divided navy reduces the likelihood of a military insur-
rection against the Chinese Communist Party, it also weakens its power against
China’s enemies. Such a divide-and-rule strategy precludes the high level of fleet
coordination and ship-to-ship interoperability necessary to defeat any major
foreign foe.
Finally, as discussed in great detail by Wright, China’s nineteenth-century im-
perial navy was more bought than built, and therefore, it “could be truly said to
be at the cutting edge of the technology of the Victorian era.” Beginning in the
1860s, China became a major importer of European naval technology, and by
1882 the Chinese navy consisted of approximately fifty steamships. While half
were built with foreign help in China, at either the Shanghai or Fuzhou shipyard,
the largest and most modern ships were purchased from abroad, especially from
Britain and Germany.
By far the most important ships in the late-nineteenth-century Chinese fleet
were two German-built battleships, Ding Yuan and Zhen Yuan, each displacing
7,430 tons. Because they were protected by fourteen-inch armor belts and bore
four twelve-inch Krupp guns, these two ships were thought to be invincible.
Certainly, they were more powerful than any battleship then in service in the
Japanese navy.
Yet while these two battleships were perhaps rightfully considered formida-
ble, they were poorly manned and did not carry sufficient ammunition either to
destroy the opponent’s fleet or protect their own. As a result, China was easily
defeated by Japan, losing five ships and destroying none during the 17 Septem-
ber 1894 battle of the Yellow Sea. Also, once China lost control of its repair docks
at Port Arthur, nothing could be done to put its damaged foreign-built ships
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back in service. The Ding Yuan was eventually scuttled, near the end of the
Sino-Japanese War, while the Zhen Yuan was taken intact by Japan and added to
the Japanese fleet.
China’s contemporary navy has repeated this historical pattern of using for-
eign help to build its support ships, while buying warships from abroad as the
vanguard. Although the PLAN appears to be justifiably proud of Shenzhen, its
most recent Chinese-built Luhai-class destroyer, the PLAN’s real fighting
strength resides in the Russian-built Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroy-
ers. China has already received two of these ships, while two more are on order
and could be ready as early as 2005. No matter how powerful the Sovremennys
might appear on paper, if they are forced to act in isolation for lack of a unified
fleet, they could offer only limited resistance to a coordinated attack.
Likewise, armaments and maintenance remain a major problem. The PLAN
purchased from Russia the SS-N-22 Sunburn ship-to-ship missile, currently one
of China’s most lethal naval weapons. The Sovremennys reportedly carried
fifty-four Sunburn missiles upon delivery. But China does not have the facilities
to repair these foreign-built ships. The destroyers would have to be returned to
Russia for repairs and refitting.
Srikanth Kondapalli’s China’s Naval Power distinguishes itself by making ex-
tensive and expert use of a wide range of Chinese-language sources to look at the
contemporary PLAN. Kondapalli’s approach is mainly bottom-up. He discusses
in great detail the PLAN’s specific structure, ships, and armaments. He also de-
votes much attention to the command structure and organization, personnel
and training, and the near and long-term strategic intentions of China’s navy.
Kondapalli sees the glass as half-full, arguing that “the Chinese Navy is attempt-
ing a comprehensive transition in strategy and tactics, equipment acquisition,
training programmes and so on to leapfrog into higher naval capabilities.” While
the United States and its close allies, such as Japan, may not be directly threat-
ened, Kondapalli warns that China’s other neighbors, such as his own country of
India, will certainly be affected by these changes as “tensions are bound to rise
with the rise of China’s naval power.”
Although Kondapalli notes that the PLAN’s structure, “the location of the
three sea fleets, naval bases, and so on,” is similar to those of earlier Chinese na-
vies, he argues that the PLAN is an outgrowth of the PLA’s infantry units, which
means that “the command and control mechanisms, political and engineering
techniques and logistical aspects differed considerably from their [naval] prede-
cessors.” The Chinese Communist Party, through the Central Military Commis-
sion, retains full authority over the PLAN’s strategy and performance. However,
since the PLAN’s highest loyalty is to the party and not to the Chinese nation as a
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whole, this structure closely parallels the imperial navy’s loyalty to the Manchus
of the Qing dynasty rather than to the Han Chinese people.
Because of the structural subordination of the PLAN, the PLA maintains au-
thority over the navy. The naval commanders of the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea
Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet act only as deputy commanders under the com-
manding PLA generals in the three respective military regions. During times of
war, orders to the fleets would, in theory, come directly to the fleets through the
military regions, not through the naval hierarchy. This PLA-dominated com-
mand structure helps guarantee the PLAN’s loyalty to the party.
Each fleet is assigned separate tasks and responsibilities. For example, the
North Sea Fleet, based at Qingdao, is the largest and so represents the “combat
backbone” of the Chinese navy. Originally focused on the Soviet Union, the
northern fleet now concentrates on the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and U.S. naval
forces. The East Sea Fleet, based in Shanghai, is responsible for Taiwan. The first
two Sovremennys were made part of this fleet and are based at Dinghai, located
northwest of Taiwan. Accordingly, with the “reunification of China top on the
agenda of the PRC leadership[,] . . . the East Sea Fleet is expected to play a crucial
role in the coming years.” Finally, the South Sea Fleet based in Zhanjiang is fo-
cused on Vietnam and the Philippines. It has responsibility for defending
China’s claims to the disputed South China Sea. The EP-3 incident of April 2001
took place within the jurisdiction of this fleet.
Kondapalli admits that the PLAN’s division into three fleets may contribute
to contemporary problems “related to logistics, training and so on,” but he is op-
timistic that it will not hinder China’s maritime progress. He even suggests that
there might be benefits: “The specialized nature of warfare in the South China
Sea and other areas may result in confining naval equipment and men to a par-
ticular fleet only, though redeployment in other fleets has not been unheard of.”
Kondapalli may be underestimating these structural problems. For example,
there have been reports of unrest among southern crews assigned northern offi-
cers and among northern crews assigned southern officers. Regional loyalties
still threaten Chinese naval effectiveness, just as they did a century ago in the
first Sino-Japanese War.
Kondapalli also tries to evaluate the qualifications of the men and women
who staff the PLAN. He allocates a significant proportion of his book to describ-
ing the background of naval officers and judging the quality of their training. He
concludes that beginning in the 1950s, PLAN training was based almost com-
pletely on Soviet training manuals and procedures. Many of these Soviet tech-
niques continue to hold sway to this day, especially with regard to the basic
division of the subject materials into a “common curriculum,” “professional
techniques,” and “tactics.”
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This Soviet-style training was especially important when most Chinese naval
recruits were uneducated peasants. However, during the past two decades the
PLAN leadership has attempted to increase the number of college graduates in
its officer corps. By the mid-1990s, 85 percent of the officers in command of na-
val vessels reportedly had college educations. To increase the percentage of edu-
cated officers across the board, beginning in 1999 the PLAN began to recruit
“1,000 officers annually from non-military universities and colleges.”
As part of a special “Captains Project,” promising officers were sent back to
college for advanced study, especially in the physical sciences and engineering.
The “Crack Units Project” emphasized officer training in advanced weapons sys-
tems, while in the “Thousand Generals Project,” one thousand officers, includ-
ing many from the navy, were promoted to the rank of general or admiral on the
theory that “these officers would [better] foresee the modernization pro-
gramme of the armed forces in the coming decades.” These kinds of incentive
programs are becoming more and more common as China builds for itself and
purchases from abroad more advanced technology ships and weapon systems.
The PLAN continues to emphasize political training. Study of the party’s po-
litical line is required. Officers are judged for promotion in part based on how
well they carry out the party’s directives. Many aspects of the political indoctri-
nation system, such as the focus on party discipline and unquestioning obedi-
ence to party orders, were adopted directly from the Soviet Union and have
continued unchanged to this day. As a result of the overall effectiveness of politi-
cal training, Kondapalli concludes, “the political work system has contributed to
a relatively stable, cohesive and politically vibrant navy.”
When it comes to technical training, however, China “remains far below
global levels, including that of its neighbors like Japan, Taiwan, and India.” The
large range of equipment, both indigenous and foreign, has greatly complicated
training. China has had “mixed results” solving this problem. As China “equips
itself with modern, second and probably third-generation naval vessels in the
near future, this contradiction between men and material/technology becomes
acute.” Kondapalli further warns, “In training, the PLAN is still beleaguered
with problems of inadequate training time, limitations in live-fire exercises, in-
sufficient missile allowances, ineffective unification of command and control,
integration of different weapon systems, etc.” These views parallel Wright’s ob-
servations about China’s nineteenth-century navy.
Looking at the PLAN’s near and long-term naval strategy, Kondapalli sees sig-
nificant changes from the coastal defense strategy adopted by the imperial Chi-
nese navy. He concludes that China’s strategy has recently evolved from coastal
defense and shore denial to a more general policy of “sea denial,” and that the
growth of the PLAN inventory will “enable China to launch effectively into the
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high seas between the second and third decades of the new millennium.” China’s
decision to move toward a “blue-water navy” is generally credited to the PLAN
commander, Liu Huaqing, who “is likened to Alfred Thayer Mahan for his em-
phasis on sea power.” Liu led the PLA’s influential “sea power faction” under
Deng Xiaoping.
A large share of the credit for this maritime strategy must go to Russia, how-
ever, since PLAN purchases of Russian equipment have let it skip many develop-
mental stages. This applies specifically to the Sovremennys, Sunburn missiles,
Kilo-class submarines, and Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft. China has also purchased
the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag (though for what purpose is unclear)
from Ukraine. According to Kondapalli, for China to pursue an effective sea-
denial policy would require “at least two aircraft carriers, two SSBNs, about six
SSNs, twenty diesel-powered conventional submarines, 16–18 destroyers and
about thirty frigates.” According to Kondapalli’s positive estimates, China could
develop its own aircraft carrier as soon as 2005, allowing it to achieve these goals
soon after 2010.
But for all his warnings of China’s projected rapid naval growth, Kondapalli
also sees practical limitations to its strategy. In addition to the PLAN’s “deficien-
cies in power projection, the PLAN’s offensive operations are also constrained
by the need to allocate and maintain at least some of its naval forces at
homeports for such contingencies as opposing possible enemy expeditions
against the Chinese mainland.” Thus, in the end, Kondapalli acknowledges that
the requirements of China’s extensive coastal defense network may provide
practical barriers to any aggressive naval strategy by the PRC government.
Bernard D. Cole’s The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-first
Century is the most recent of the three books reviewed here. Although not as
heavily based on archival and Chinese sources and therefore less packed with de-
tail than the first two books, this work does a better job following Clausewitz’s
advice to avoid the “weeds” or extraneous details that can cloud our understand-
ing and instead focus on the core issues relating to China’s future naval strategy.
Cole emphasizes China’s territorial and economic interests, its doctrinal and op-
erational goals, and its maritime strategy. Based on this top-down approach,
Cole sees the glass half-empty; he is clearly less convinced than Kondapalli that
China can build a blue-water fleet in the near future. He concludes, “Beijing ap-
parently does not believe current maritime concerns are serious enough to
change China’s historic dependence on continental power, or to build a modern
maritime force that will dominate the Asia-Pacific.”
China’s power projection and economic interests are primarily regional, not
global. Therefore, Beijing’s main focus is on the maritime regions contiguous to
China. In the near future, the U.S. Navy will remain dominant in the Pacific and
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East Asian waters. Beijing views Washington’s security relations with Tokyo and
military support for Taipei as attempts to stop China from protecting its natural
territorial and economic interests throughout the Far East. This perception,
whether real or imagined, has had a deep impact on Beijing’s strategic concepts
and plans. It sees “a hostile world in which the United States is using Europe and
Japan to contain China and prevent it from attaining its rightful global status.”
Although this book came out immediately prior to the events of 11 September
2001, the deployment of American troops in Afghanistan and throughout Cen-
tral Asia can only exacerbate such feelings of insecurity.
Viewed from this perspective, China’s desire to enforce its territorial claims
throughout the extensive maritime regions along its borders constitutes a key
motivation for China to build a strong navy. Cole lists six of the disputed territo-
rial claims: the Diaoyutai (known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands), Taiwan,
Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, South China Sea, and China’s maritime border
with Vietnam. Although Taiwan is undoubtedly China’s most important politi-
cal problem, the territorial dispute over the South China Sea is a close second,
because of the key international sea lines of communication involved. Beijing
currently claims the entire Paracel and Spratly Islands, plus all the waters of the
South China Sea. China’s navy has repeatedly clashed with forces from Vietnam
and has had territorial frictions with the Philippines. Cole predicts that Beijing
will rely increasingly on the PLAN for “ensuring the security of China’s insular
territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.”
China’s territorial and economic interests arguably go hand in hand, since
major shipping lanes, extensive fisheries, and a wide variety of energy sources
are located in these regions. In particular, a high percentage of China’s petro-
leum and natural gas reserves are found beneath offshore waters. Since these ar-
eas “lie outside Beijing’s normal military parameters,” potential threats could
only be “met by naval and air forces.” Many potential energy sources have yet to
be explored. Chinese estimates for energy reserves in the South China Sea are
impressive—213 billion barrels of oil and two thousand trillion cubic feet of
natural gas. Although Cole cautions that these estimates may be inflated, he con-
cedes that “China’s belief in these estimates is more important than their dubi-
ous accuracy, and Beijing’s high expectations strengthen its determination to
protect its sovereignty claims in the Spratly Islands.”
Cole demonstrates that China has maritime assets that the PLAN must pro-
tect, but can China’s navy do the job? Cole provides a much more cautious eval-
uation of the PLAN’s capabilities than does Kondapalli, acknowledging
significant strides in such fields as surface ships, naval aviation, and ballistic
missiles but also noting serious shortfalls in antisubmarine warfare, systems in-
tegration, and maintenance and supply capabilities. Perhaps China’s most
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serious failing is its “platform-centric” naval and air operations, based for the
most part on outdated (compared to the United States) Russian technology,
such as the Sovremennys and Kilos. Moreover, even those surface ships and sub-
marines produced wholly in China rely “heavily on foreign-designed/produced
engineering, weapons, and sensor systems.” Thus, based on its existing force
structure, “China’s Navy has a very long way to go before becoming a twenty-
first-century force.”
Whether China’s navy can succeed in its overall mission of defending China’s
national interests may depend not only on equipment but also on its operational
doctrine. Cole believes that doctrine could help “compensate for some materiel
shortfalls.” Assuming that the United States is China’s main enemy, then the
PLAN would need to find an “operational schema that will allow them to defeat,
or at least sidestep, U.S. naval and air power.” One possibility would be to rely on
“speed, mobility, flexibility, and initiative” in order to attack preemptively a
point of American weakness. While this kind of asymmetric warfare may suc-
ceed in taking the United States by surprise once, its effectiveness would dimin-
ish as the U.S. Navy brings additional assets into the theater of operations.
Therefore, Cole concludes that any direct confrontation between China and the
United States is unlikely. He suggests that “Chinese maritime power for at least
the next fifty years will lack the capability for successful direct confrontation
with U.S. forces.”
If the U.S. Navy does not have to worry about the PLAN for some time, this is
not the case for other Asian powers. China can easily dominate most of its South
and Southeast Asian neighbors and has already chalked up naval victories
against Vietnam. India, in particular, is increasingly concerned about what it
sees as China’s goal of establishing a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. How-
ever, with regard to Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, the PLAN still lags roughly
ten to twenty years behind.
Cole looks to China’s maritime strategy to determine whether China will
pose a future threat to the United States. In 1997 China’s president, Jiang
Zemin, urged the Chinese navy to “build the nation’s maritime great wall.”
Cole is quick to caution that “Beijing is learning, however, that modern navies
are technology-dependent and resource-intensive; they cannot be acquired
quickly.” To overcome these technical and financial shortcomings requires a
coherent naval strategy. Cole suggests that China has formulated its strategy
largely by learning and adopting certain preconceptions from the former Soviet
Union. Also, advocates of a strong Chinese navy have attempted to use the U.S.
threat to overcome the continuing army dominance of the PLAN. Far from
overcoming interservice rivalries, there are those in the navy who fuel such rival-
ries. By focusing on U.S. naval power and by accusing the United States of using
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its navy as a tool for global hegemony, they hope to acquire a “greater role . . . in
the national security policy process.”
Although China cannot currently challenge the United States militarily, the
PLAN hopes to develop a maritime strategy that will allow it to “overcome rec-
ognized shortcomings in doctrine, equipment, and training.” If properly exe-
cuted under the right circumstances, such a strategy could allow China to negate
Japan’s technological lead, retake Taiwan, secure its territorial claims to the
South China Sea, counter India’s growing naval power, and protect its vital sea
lines of communication. However, the impediments to such a policy are great.
Cole suggests that China can attain its goals only if, first, “Beijing changes the
national prioritization of resource allocation necessary to build a modern mari-
time force,” and second, “if Japan and the United States allow it to occur.” The
chance of both these factors happening simultaneously he finds to be “extremely
unlikely.”
Cole concludes that China is unwilling to invest in a real blue-water navy; this
makes moot China’s regional maritime ambitions. Therefore, although he
agrees with Kondapalli that the PLAN has developed quickly in recent years, its
strategies remain similar to the “coastal defense” policies of the former imperial
navy. In effect, Cole merges aspects of Kondapalli and Wright, since he agrees
that China’s strategy is based on “sea denial”; but without an effective blue-water
navy China must rely on its “flotilla defense” forces to guard its coastal waters
from attack. Thus China, “like Britain circa 1907 and the Soviet Union in the
1920s, is still building a navy capable of nothing more than expanded coastal de-
fense. The area to be defended has been increased from a few miles to more than
two hundred, and the primary weapons of choice may be cruise and ballistic
missiles vice torpedoes, but the concept is little changed.”
If Cole is correct, in the coming years the PLAN will function as little more
than a newly modernized Chinese “imperial” navy, with the Chinese Commu-
nist Party serving in the place of a hereditary autocracy. Although it will have
better ships, submarines, and missiles, the immediate goals of this navy will be
much as before—putting down domestic uprisings and protecting China’s
lengthy coastline from attack. This strategy will necessarily focus the PLAN’s en-
ergies against Taiwan, on the one hand, and against China’s closest Asian neigh-
bors—Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam—on the other.
Although these three authors do excellent jobs of analyzing the Chinese navy,
there are still many unanswered questions. Chinese ambitions cannot be under-
stood outside their geopolitical context. For the last century, China, Japan, and
Russia have been locked in a struggle for influence over Northeast Asia. This has
involved shifting spheres of influence in Central Asia, Mongolia, Manchuria,
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and Korea. Contrary to the viewpoints expressed here, which emphasize Chi-
nese relations with the West, from the Chinese point of view the essential foreign
policy concerns have been with their long and disputed border with Russia and
their ambitions to reverse the verdict of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 by re-
storing China to its historical dominance over the Far East—that is, to supplant
Japan as the premier regional power.
It is necessary to put Chinese technological acquisitions and naval develop-
ment into this regional context in order to examine both China’s evolving inter-
national ambitions and its current military strategies. Some inadequately
answered questions are: What have been the overriding foreign policy objectives
of the Chinese government? What naval strategies have the Chinese employed to
realize these objectives? What technological acquisitions has China made in or-
der to support these strategies? How have the answers to such questions changed
over time?
Other important questions involve China’s relations with the Soviet Union
and Russia. What was the nature and amount of Soviet naval assistance to China
during the 1945–1960 period, including financial assistance, technology trans-
fers, specific military hardware, and military doctrine? What was their impact
on the formation, training, and tactics of the PLAN? What was the impact of the
1960 Sino-Soviet split over Chinese naval technology and doctrine? How did the
Chinese continue to use their Soviet equipment and, more importantly, to what
extent did they continue using Soviet-based technology, doctrine, tactics, and
training methods? How did this early period of Sino-Soviet cooperation and then
competition affect the renewal of Sino-Russian relations and naval technology
transfer in the late 1980s and, especially, in the 1990s?
Finally, some specific questions concerning Japan are: How has the post–World
War II development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force affected Chinese
naval policy? How has the U.S.-Japan security pact, particularly the provision of
advanced U.S. naval technology, impacted the force structure of the Chinese navy?
How will China react to Japan’s recent decision to send warships to the Indian
Ocean in support of the anti-terror war?
Until the Chinese navy is put into its proper geopolitical context—which,
from the Chinese point of view, has traditionally centered on Russia and Japan,
and is only secondarily concerned with the United States—it will be all too easy
to misjudge China’s intentions.
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